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ABSTRACT. This paper investigates under what con-
ditions a good corporate social responsibility (CSR) can
compensate for a relatively poor corporate ability (CA)
(quality), and vice versa. The authors conducted an
experiment among business administration students, in
which information about a financial services companys
CA and CSR was provided. Participants indicated their
preferences for the companys products, stocks, and jobs.
The results show that for stock and job preferences, a
poor CA can be compensated by a good CSR. For
product preferences, a poor CA could not be compen-
sated by a good CSR, at least when people thought that
CA is personally relevant to them. Furthermore, a poor
CSR could be compensated by a good CA for product,
stocks, and job preferences.
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Introduction
Doing good has become increasingly important in
the last decades. Developments in this area have led
to an ever-increasing attention to what became to be
coined as CSR, i.e., corporate social responsibility.
Following del Mar Garcia de los Salmones et al.
(2005, p. 369), we define CSR as: ‘‘the moral obli-
gations that maximize the positive impact of the firm
on its social environment and minimize the negative
impact.’’ It includes such issues as environmental
protection, relations with local communities,
working conditions, and donations to charities.
Business benefits, while not the only motivation for
companies to engage in actions aimed at CSR, do
strengthen the case for engaging in such actions.
While previous studies have sometimes provided
mixed results, in general they show that CSR actions
have a positive influence on the preferences of con-
sumers (e.g., Brown and Dacin, 1997; del Mar Garcia
de los Salmones et al., 2005), investors (see Orlitzky
et al., 2003), and job applicants (e.g., Backhaus et al.,
2002; Greening and Turban, 2000). In addition,
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previous research has provided insights into the
conditions under which CSR has a positive influence.
For example, several studies have shown that certain
types of CSR have more influence on the preferences
of different stakeholders than others (Greening and
Turban, 2000; Hillman and Keim, 2001; Sen and
Bhattacharya, 2001). In addition, Madrigal (2000)
found that the influence of CSR on consumer
product preferences is especially strong when people
perceive the product to fit well with the company.
Similarly, Goll and Rasheed (2004) established that
the influence of CSR on investor preferences is
especially strong in dynamic and munificent business
environments.
However, corporate resources, in terms of time,
money and managerial attention are scarce. This
problem of scarcity is aggravated by the fact that most
firms compete in different markets simultaneously,
i.e., in consumer markets for selling their products, in
labor markets for attracting the best personnel and in
financial markets for attracting investors. Managers
thus have to make well-underpinned allocation
decisions, carefully considering the added value of
each dollar they invest in each of their business
activities. Instead of investing in a good CSR record,
the resources may be needed for sustaining and
developing the abilities the company needs to com-
pete in the market and to deliver the appropriate
quality. Therefore, a trade-off is often needed, even if
managers might wish to have an excellent reputation
on both aspects. It is important to know how invest-
ments in corporate ability (CA) versus CSR pay off in
product, job and financial markets, respectively.
Previous research did not make clear whether, and
when, a favorable CSR can compensate for weaknesses
in CA. CA refers to a ‘‘companys expertise in pro-
ducing and delivering its outputs’’ (Brown and Da-
cin, 1997, p. 68). It includes not only product quality,
but also attributes like innovativeness, customer
orientation, and others. Suppose a customer facing a
purchase decision can choose between the products
of two companies. One has excellent products and
services, but also has a reputation for polluting the
environment, mistreating its employees, and disre-
garding community interests. The other companys
products and services are of below average quality,
but it has an excellent track record regarding envi-
ronmental impact, employee treatment, and com-
munity relations. Which company will the person
choose, and why? Will the company with a better
CSR record be chosen, even though it has a rela-
tively low quality? Our research question, therefore,
is: are CA and CSR stand-alone business activities, or
are there synergies between them, such that lagging
performance in one of them cannot be compensated
by the other? In particular, we want to find out under
which conditions favorable information on a com-
panys CA and favorable information on a companys
CSR are both necessary to establish favorable pref-
erences, and under which conditions favorable
information on one aspect can compensate for
unfavorable information on the other aspect. Fol-
lowing the focus of previous studies on the benefits of
CSR, we focus on peoples reactions to a companys
products, stocks, and job offers.
The likelihood of stakeholders trading off
CSR and CA
Several authors in cognitive psychology have looked
at the more general question of whether positive
attributes can compensate for negative attributes.
Research on decision-making has demonstrated that
people often do not trade off all attributes of all
decision options against each other, but employ a
diversity of heuristics (see Bettman et al., 1998;
Dawes, 1964). One such heuristic is to look at only
the best attributes an option has. This is called
‘‘disjunctive’’ decision-making. Another heuristic is
to look only at the worst attributes, which is called
‘‘conjunctive’’ decision-making. In the latter strat-
egy, a positive attribute cannot compensate for a
negative attribute. Furthermore, research has shown
that in forming an overall evaluation, negative and
extreme attributes tend to weigh more heavily than
positive and moderate attributes (Anderson, 1981;
Baumeister et al., 2001; Lynch, 1979). These find-
ings have been called ‘‘negativity effect’’ and
‘‘extremity effect,’’ respectively. The presence of a
negativity effect suggests that positive attributes
cannot fully compensate for negative attributes,
consistent with conjunctive decision-making. Folkes
and Kamins (1999) showed that ‘‘negativity effects’’
occur both for CSR and for CA. Their results
demonstrate that when a company acts unethically,
the quality of its product (i.e., CA) does not influ-
ence peoples attitudes toward the firm. Similarly,
when a company has an inferior product, acting
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prosocially does not influence peoples attitudes.
Similar results have been obtained by Handelman
and Arnold (1999) and by Barone et al. (2000).
These results suggest that consumers perceive both
CA and CSR to be necessary attributes of a com-
pany, so that a good CA record cannot compensate
for a poor CSR record, and vice versa.
However, these previous studies have not inves-
tigated under what conditions these effects are more
likely to occur. It seems likely that in some situa-
tions, a good CA can compensate for a relatively
poor CSR, and similarly, that in some situations, a
good CSR can compensate for a poor CA. Clearly,
in many cases people continue to buy from com-
panies with a publicly known poor CSR record
because they like their products (e.g., Carrigan and
Attalla, 2001). For them, the products good quality
offsets the poor CSR. Similarly, some idealistic
people may continue to buy from companies with a
good CSR record despite a relatively poor quality, in
which case a good CSR offsets a poor quality.
Some research in cognitive psychology has
focussed on the conditions facilitating negativity
effects in general (Baron and Spranca, 1997; Bau-
meister et al., 2001; Luce et al., 1999; Tetlock et al.,
2000). These studies show that for some attributes,
negative information threatens a persons personal
goals or values. When an object is rated poorly on
such attributes, this cannot be compensated by other
attributes. We propose here that these results shed
some light on this issue of when CA and CSR can
compensate each other in peoples overall evaluation
of companies. Particularly, we propose that the de-
gree to which CA or CSR information presents a
potential threat to a persons goals predicts whether
or not unfavorable CA and CSR information can be
compensated.
Hypotheses development
The research model used in this study is shown in
Figure 1. Consistent with previous research (e.g.,
Greening and Turban, 2000; Hillman and Keim,
2001; Sen and Bhattacharya, 2001), we expect that
information about a companys CA and CSR has a
significant positive influence on peoples behavioral
intentions regarding the companys products, stocks,
and jobs.
Following previous studies which examined the
question of whether CA and CSR can compensate
each other (Barone et al., 2000; Folkes and Kamins,
1999; Handelman and Arnold, 1999), we expect that
on average, favorable CSR information cannot
compensate for unfavorable CA information, and
vice versa, that favorable CA information cannot
compensate for unfavorable CSR information. As
Billings and Marcus (1983) point out, non-com-
pensatory processing may be investigated by exam-
ining interactions between attributes. A significant
positive interaction would indicate that when one
attribute is poor, other attributes have less effect than
when the attribute is good. We expect CA to posi-
tively moderate the effect of CSR on peoples intentions,
and CSR to positively moderate the effect of CA on
peoples intentions. The first hypothesis is therefore:
H1a: The weaker an organizations performance
on CA, the weaker the relationship between
its CSR performance and a persons inten-
tion to do business with that organization.
H1b: The weaker an organizations performance
on CSR, the weaker the relationship between
its CA performance and a persons intention
to do business with that organization.
But under what conditions can we expect that such
















Figure 1. The effect of personal relevance on the inter-
active effects of Corporate Ability and Corporate Social
Responsibility information on behavioral intentions
toward products, stocks, and jobs.
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research in the psychology of decision-making has
shown that some attributes of objects may pose
threats to important personal goals (e.g., good
health, survival, happiness) when they are unfavor-
able (Baron and Spranca, 1997; Luce et al., 1999;
Tetlock et al., 2000).
When such goals are threatened, these attributes
become associated with potential negative emotions
(Lazarus, 1991). As a way to cope with these emo-
tions, people may then resist trading off the attributes
against other attributes (Jones and Johnson, 1973;
Luce et al., 1999). For example, most consumers
would prefer a safe car to an unsafe car, no matter
how much cheaper the unsafe car is. Research has
also shown that this perceived relevance to impor-
tant goals is more than ‘‘merely’’ an evaluation of
attribute importance (Luce et al., 1999, 2000). For
example, in choosing a car, a person may judge
safety to be equally important as style or price, but
still find an unsafe car to far be more personally
threatening than an ugly or expensive car.
Following this reasoning, we can expect that when
information on a companys CA or CSR is personally
relevant to people, i.e., when this information is
relevant to their important (high-ranking) goals,
people will not consider entering into a relationship
with a company that has a poor CA or CSR record,
no matter how favorable other attributes are. How-
ever, it still remains to be seen whether CA and CSR
information really can be directly personally relevant
to people. In the next section, we discuss situations in
which information about a companys CA could be
relevant to peoples important personal goals, so that
they would refuse to compensate a poor CA. Next,
we consider situations in which information on a
companys CSR may be relevant to peoples
important goals.
The personal relevance of CA information
In some situations, information on a companys CA
could be personally relevant to people in the context
of deciding to buy a product or a companys stocks,
or in deciding whether to apply for a certain job. For
example, when a customer is planning to invest a
large sum of money in a fund, information on an
investment companys CA can be relevant to the
customers goal of making money, or avoiding losing
money. The customer may reason that doing busi-
ness with a low-CA company will increase the
probability of losing money (cf. Gu¨rhan-Canli and
Batra, 2004). Similarly, an investor may reason that a
companys CA will likely impact the companys
financial performance, and therefore the returns he
or she will get from a companys stocks. Finally,
because of this link with a companys financial per-
formance, a companys CA may impact the security
of a job at the company, which may also be an
important goal to people when they have to decide
about accepting a job offer. In addition, a companys
CA could influence the self-esteem that a person
derives from working at the company (Greening and
Turban, 2000).
When information about a companys CA is
linked to the personal goals that people want to
achieve in a certain situation, it is likely that a good
CSR record cannot compensate a poor CA. For
example, in such a case, a person will not consider
investing in a fund from a company with a poor
CA, no matter how well it performs in terms of
CSR.
Conversely, people may sometimes perceive CA
information to be less personally relevant. For
example, people may believe that the performance
of an investment fund depends on the performance
of the market as a whole, rather than on the
expertise of the investment company. Or they may
find the quality of the product itself to be relatively
unimportant to fulfill their goals. This would likely
be the case for typical ‘‘low-involvement’’ prod-
ucts, such as fast moving consumer goods. Simi-
larly, some people may not think that working for
a company with a poor CA would endanger their
job security or self-esteem. For example, this may
be the case for some companies in the public sec-
tor, in which job security does not directly depend
on the companys performance. In such cases, CA
information should not be relevant to predict
whether or not an important goal will be fulfilled.
Then, we can expect that information about a
companys CSR can have a positive effect on
intentions, even when information on CA is
unfavorable. Thus, the interaction between CA and
CSR will be stronger when CA is perceived as personally
relevant, than when CA is not perceived as personally
relevant. We therefore formulate the following
hypothesis.
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H2a: The higher the personal relevance of CA,
the more seriously a weak organizational CA
performance undermines the relationship
between performance on CSR and that
persons intention to do business with that
organization.
The personal relevance of CSR information
Information on a companys CSR may also be relevant
to peoples goals in the context of choosing a product,
stock, or job. For example, a companys reputation for
environmental friendliness may be relevant for con-
sumers to evaluate the quality of a specific environ-
mentally friendly product (Madrigal, 2000). Similarly,
a companys reputation for CSR may be relevant for
investors who have to decide whether or not to buy a
companys stocks, since they may reason that the
quality of a companys relationships with its stake-
holders is likely to impact its performance (Epstein and
Schnietz, 2002). Job applicants perceptions of the way
a company treats its employees (a type of CSR) are
likely to be relevant for the satisfaction they expect
from accepting a job offer from the company
(Schwoerer and Rosen, 1989). In addition, for deci-
sions regarding products, stocks, as well as job offers,
paying attention to CSR may be relevant for people in
order to live their lives according to their moral values
(Frank, 1996). Furthermore, entering into a rela-
tionship with a socially responsible company may be a
way to express ones personal identity (Sen and
Bhattacharya, 2001). When CSR is relevant to
important goals, we can expect that a favorable CA
cannot compensate for an unfavorable CSR.
Conversely, some people may not perceive CSR to
be relevant to their goals in a specific situation. For
example, some people may think that a companys
CSR activities are irrelevant in predicting the per-
formance of the companys stock. Or they may not
perceive the type of CSR activities that a company
displays to be relevant to their values or personal
identities. When CSR is not relevant to peoples
important goals, we can expect that a good CA can
compensate for a poor CSR. In other words, the
interaction between CA and CSR will be stronger when
CSR is perceived as personally relevant, than when
CSR is not perceived as personally relevant. We
therefore hypothesize, in analogy to hypothesis 2a:
H2b: The higher the personal relevance of CSR,
the more seriously a weak organizational
CSR undermines the relationship between
performance on CA and that persons inten-
tion to do business with that organization.
Method
To test the hypotheses, we conducted an Internet-
based experiment. In this experiment, we manipulated
CA and CSR information between subjects in the form
of scenarios1. These scenarios were about a financial
services provider offering investment funds. The reason
for this choice was that, on the one hand, these types of
products can have clear negative consequences that are
hard to avoid, but that on the other hand, some people
may see CA as irrelevant to these consequences2.
Therefore, it seems likely that there would be sufficient
variation in the degree to which respondents perceived
the companys CA as personally relevant in the context
of evaluating a product.
Materials
We provided respondents with descriptions of a fic-
titious Canadian company called ‘‘Groupe Lejeune.’’
We chose a Canadian company because the respon-
dents used in this study (Dutch students) could be
assumed to be relatively unfamiliar with Canadian
companies in general, and with Canadian banks in
particular. This was necessary in order to make sure
respondents would regard the materials as realistic. In
addition, most people in the Netherlands probably
know that Canada is a developed Western country,
but are still relatively unfamiliar with it, and therefore
do not have strong opinions regarding the country.
Therefore, we could assume that Canada as the
country of origin of a bank would likely neither evoke
very negative nor very positive associations among
our respondents. The companys CA was operation-
alized as the overall quality of this companys products
and services (high and low), in the form of Consumer
Reports type tables regarding two different services:
advice about loans and car insurance. CSR was op-
erationalized as the degree to which the company
‘‘screens’’ companies and other entities it invests in on
their ethical conduct (to a high degree versus not at
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all). A specific example was discussed regarding the
companys investments in rainforest logging compa-
nies. To ensure sufficient realism of the CA and CSR
manipulations, we deliberately chose to avoid ex-
treme levels of either one. Thus, the companys ser-
vice quality was portrayed as one of the weaker in the
‘‘poor CA’’ condition, and as one of the better in the
‘‘high CA’’ condition. Similarly, the type of CSR that
was discussed was not such that most people would
perceive it as extremely negative or extremely posi-
tive. A qualitative pretest among four respondents
(business administration students) showed that they
perceived the materials as credible. Some of these
respondents also indicated that the questionnaire was
rather long. All experimental materials are provided in
Appendix A.
In addition to CA and CSR, we manipulated the
type of preference within subjects, by giving infor-
mation about a high risk investment fund (an ‘‘Asian
Tigers Fund’’) marketed by the company, a job offer
by the company (a traineeship), and the companys
own stocks. The dependent variables are peoples
behavioral intentions regarding these three objects.
The result is a 2 (CA) 2 (CSR) 3 (preference type)
mixed design. The order of all manipulations was
randomized between subjects, to avoid order effects.
Respondents
A total of 112 undergraduate business administration
students participated in the study. Students were
recruited via their enrollment in specific courses, and
assigned randomly to one of the experimental con-
ditions. We think that the use of a student sample is
justified for our research, first, because the goal of an
experiment is to maximize internal validity, rather
than external validity. While students might not be
representative of consumers in general, our primary
aim is to establish whether the hypothesized effects
occur at all, leaving the question for whom these
effects apply for future studies. Second, we think that
the stimuli we provided are likely to be relevant to
business administration students. These students are
likely to have some interest in traineeships and
financial investments. On the other hand, they are
unlikely to own the kind of money needed for a
substantial investment. To circumvent this problem,
we asked the respondents to imagine they had
unexpectedly received a large amount of money
(e100,000) and had already decided to invest this
money in an Asian investment fund or in a portfolio
of stocks, respectively.
Procedure
An online (HTML) questionnaire was used for the
experiment. Subjects were instructed to follow a link
to a web page, on which the questionnaire could be
found. Care was taken to ensure that the question-
naire would run smoothly and would look identical
through any type of computer and web browser. The
descriptions of the companys CA and CSR were
presented first, followed by descriptions of the fund,
stocks, and job. For each of these objects, questions
were asked about the personal relevance of CA and
CSR information in the context of this type of
preference, as well as questions about behavioral
intentions. After this, manipulation check measures
were taken regarding the favorability of respondents
CA and CSR associations with the company. The
questionnaire concluded with inquiries into subjects
expertise regarding investing, as well as their age and
gender.
Measures
All measures and their reliabilities can be found in
Appendix B. All dependent, independent, and
moderator variables were measured on 7-point
semantic differential scales. Descriptive statistics for
all composite scales for each experimental cell are
provided in Table I, and correlations between the
main variables for each of the three types of pref-
erence are provided in Table II.
Dependent measures
We measured peoples behavioral intentions
regarding the fund, stocks, and job on two semantic
differential scales for the fund and the stocks, and on
three scales for the job offer (cf. Schwoerer and
Rosen, 1989).
Moderator measures
To measure the degree to which the information
on the companys CA and CSR was personally
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relevant to respondents in the case of the
investment fund, the stocks, and the jobs, we
adapted measures of perceived diagnosticity, ask-
ing about the perceived usefulness of a specific
piece of information for a specific judgment (e.g.,
Aaker and Sengupta, 2000). Specifically, we asked
subjects to evaluate the perceived usefulness of
the information on CA and the information on
CSR for judging possible negative consequences
of accepting the companys product, stocks, and
job offer. To make clear what we meant by
‘‘negative consequences,’’ we first asked the
respondents about several potential risks associated
with the product: functional, financial, psycho-
logical, social, and overall risk (Jacoby and Kap-
lan, 1972).3
Manipulation check measures
Manipulation check measures for CA were taken
from the ‘‘expertise’’ dimension of Newell and
Goldsmiths (2001) corporate credibility scale. This
dimension consists of four items, but two of those
seem to deal more with the length of a companys
experience than with actual expertise. We therefore
only used the two items directly related to perceived
expertise. Two items dealing with the companys
perceived ethical behavior and social responsibility
served as a manipulation check for CSR.
TABLE I
Descriptive statistics for each experimental cell
Fund Stocks Job
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Low corporate ability
Low corporate social responsibility
Perceived corporate ability 3.67 1.12 3.67 1.12 3.67 1.12
Perceived corporate social responsibility 2.39 1.04 2.39 1.04 2.39 1.04
Behavioral intention 3.15 1.36 2.46 1.19 2.46 1.19
Personal relevance of corporate ability information 3.98 1.43 4.85 1.19 4.54 1.27
Personal relevance of corporate social responsibility information 4.24 1.45 4.80 1.58 4.87 1.67
High corporate social responsibility
Perceived corporate ability 3.57 1.11 3.57 1.11 3.57 1.11
Perceived corporate social responsibility 5.30 0.82 5.30 0.82 5.30 0.82
Behavioral intention 3.52 1.35 3.11 1.18 3.93 1.18
Personal relevance of corporate ability information 3.96 1.75 4.76 1.10 4.74 1.42
Personal relevance of corporate social responsibility information 3.80 1.58 4.44 1.70 4.83 1.52
High corporate ability
Low corporate social responsibility
Perceived corporate ability 5.63 0.67 5.63 0.67 5.63 0.67
Perceived corporate social responsibility 2.69 1.25 2.69 1.25 2.69 1.25
Behavioral intention 4.23 1.41 3.78 1.41 4.25 1.19
Personal relevance of corporate ability information 3.87 1.41 4.32 1.40 4.48 1.31
Personal relevance of corporate social responsibility information 4.11 1.50 4.45 1.48 4.79 1.16
High corporate social responsibility
Perceived corporate ability 5.29 0.77 5.29 0.77 5.29 0.77
Perceived corporate social responsibility 5.40 1.11 5.40 1.11 5.40 1.11
Behavioral intention 4.38 1.15 4.57 1.12 4.24 1.12
Personal relevance of corporate ability information 4.00 1.36 4.69 1.24 4.67 0.99
Personal relevance of corporate social responsibility information 3.98 1.49 4.55 1.14 4.74 1.29
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Scale validation
Before collecting the experimental data, we con-
ducted a qualitative pretest of the questionnaire, in
which people filled it out and commented on any
unclarities that they encountered. This is especially
important for Internet questionnaires, as respondents
are not able to ask questions while filling them in
(Evans and Mathur, 2005). This pretest resulted in a
few changes in the wording of the questions and in
the instructions. An additional pretest showed that
the wording of the final questionnaire was suffi-
ciently clear to respondents.
After the experiment, we conducted a quanti-
tative scale validation process. We did this sepa-
rately for the fund, shares, and job evaluations. In
addition, to control for the effect of the manipu-
lations on the correlations between the measures,
we used the residuals obtained from ANOVAs
estimating the influence of the experimental con-
ditions on all measured variables (Voss and Para-
suraman, 2003). First, we conducted reliability
analyses to see whether any items did not correlate
highly (above 0.4) with the scales to which they
belonged. This was not the case for any of the
measures. Second, we conducted a confirmatory
factor analysis of all measures, to assess whether all
items loaded significantly on their respective scales,
and not on other scales. The factor model showed
adequate fit for all three types of preference.
Analysis
The data were analyzed using hierarchical moder-
ated regression models with dummy variables rep-
resenting the CA and CSR conditions, and the
measures of the personal relevance of CA and CSR
information as moderators. We analyzed respon-
dents evaluations of the three types of preference
(fund, stocks, and job) separately. In addition, fol-
lowing the regression procedure described by Judd
et al. (1996), we tested whether any of the effects
differed significantly between the fund, stocks, and
job. This was done to avoid capitalizing on chance
when evaluating the same model for three different
types of preference.
Results
Before discussing the results of the regression mod-











Corporate social responsibility )0.05
Behavioral intention 0.34 0.07
Personal relevance of corporate ability )0.01 0.02 )0.21
Personal relevance of corporate social responsibility 0.02 )0.09 )0.15 0.38
Stocks
Corporate social responsibility )0.05
Behavioral intention 0.47 0.23
Personal relevance of corporate ability )0.12 0.07 0.05
Personal relevance of corporate social responsibility )0.04 )0.04 0.16 0.46
Job
Corporate social responsibility )0.05
Behavioral intention 0.15 0.01
Personal relevance of corporate ability )0.03 0.08 0.09
Personal relevance of corporate social responsibility )0.03 )0.01 0.14 0.39
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and CSR information had the intended effects on
peoples evaluations of these attributes. The results of
2 2 ANOVAs showed that the manipulation of
CA information had a significant positive influence
on the favorability of CA associations (F(1,
107) = 109.00, p = 0.00). It did not have a significant
effect on the favorability of CSR associations (F(1,
107) = 0.93, p = 0.34). Likewise, the manipulation
of CSR information had a significant positive
influence on the favorability of CSR associations
(F(1, 107) = 185.70, p = 0.00), and no significant
effect on the favorability of CA associations
(F(1, 107) = 1.51, p = 0.22). Neither one of the
manipulations had a significant effect on the per-
ceived personal relevance of CA or CSR informa-
tion. Therefore, respondents perceptions of the
company seem to correspond to the information we
gave them.
The results of the regressions are shown in
Table III. It can be seen that CA has a significant
effect on peoples intentions to engage in the
investment fund, the companys stocks, and the
TABLE III
Regression resultsa
Model Investment fund Stocks Job
B (t) B (t) B (t)
Main effects (Constant) 4.19 (9.00) 1.54 (2.91) 3.11 (5.55)
CA 0.96 (3.88) 1.42 (6.06) 0.40 (1.68)
CSR 0.24 (0.96) 0.75 (3.20) 0.03 (0.15)
Personal relevance of CA )0.16 ()1.77) 0.00 (0.05) 0.04 (0.36)
Personal relevance of CSR )0.08 ()0.91) 0.18 (2.06) 0.12 (1.24)
Adjusted R2 0.14 0.30 0.01
Two-way (Constant) 5.56 (7.26) 4.12 (4.39) 3.10 (3.66)
CA 1.27 (3.54) 1.20 (3.71) 0.49 (1.48)
CSR 0.33 (0.89) 0.64 (1.94) 0.11 (0.34)
Personal relevance of CA )0.32 ()1.65) )0.12 ()0.68) 0.20 (0.99)
Personal relevance of CSR )0.27 ()1.39) )0.22 ()1.57) )0.04 ()0.26)
CACSR )0.10 ()0.21) 0.09 (0.20) )0.19 ()0.42)
CA Personal relevance CA 0.31 (1.60) 0.23 (1.13) 0.23 (1.07)
CA Personal relevance CSR 0.29 (1.54) 0.29 (1.67) )0.11 ()0.60)
CSR Personal relevance CA 0.08 (0.41) )0.20 ()0.96) )0.69 ()3.28)
CSR Personal relevance CSR 0.09 (0.48) 0.66 (3.79) 0.54 (3.01)
Adjusted R2 0.18 0.38 0.13
Three-way (Constant) 4.92 (5.80) 4.10 (3.63) 2.77 (2.91)
CA 1.03 (2.87) 1.20 (3.64) 0.50 (1.48)
CSR 0.17 (0.45) 0.61 (1.76) 0.13 (0.38)
Personal relevance of CA 0.15 (0.56) )0.17 ()0.78) 0.31 (1.25)
Personal relevance of CSR )0.56 ()2.10) )0.17 ()1.09) )0.08 ()0.43)
CACSR 0.26 (0.51) 0.13 (0.28) )0.25 ()0.52)
CA Personal relevance CA )0.36 ()1.14) 0.31 (1.16) 0.06 (0.18)
CA Personal relevance CSR 0.58 (1.91) 0.19 (0.84) )0.09 ()0.34)
CSR Personal relevance CA )0.57 ()1.83) )0.08 ()0.25) )0.87 ()2.77)
CSR Personal relevance CSR 0.44 (1.37) 0.56 (2.48) 0.60 (2.31)
CACSR Personal relevance CA 1.06 (2.72) )0.23 ()0.55) 0.35 (0.82)
CACSR Personal relevance CSR )0.35 ()0.90) 0.26 (0.73) )0.06 ()0.15)
Adjusted R2 0.22 0.37 0.12
aAll coefficients are unstandardized regression coefficients. T-values are provided in parentheses.
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companys job offer. CSR has a significant effect on
respondents intentions toward the companys
stocks. The differences between the effects of CA
and CSR on the three preference types are con-
firmed to some degree by the regression models
testing these differences: the effect of CSR is sig-
nificantly larger for the stocks than for the job
(t = 1.80, p = 0.08), and the same holds for the
effect of CA (t = 2.72, p = 0.01).
Given the results of previous studies (e.g.,
Backhaus et al., 2002), it is somewhat surprising that
CSR has no significant influence on peoples
intentions toward the companys job offer.
However, Table III shows that for the job, there is a
significant positive interaction between CSR and
the personal relevance of CSR information
(t = 3.01, p = 0.003), and a significant negative
interaction between CSR and the personal relevance
of CA information (t = )3.28, p = 0.001). These
interactions show that when the information on the
companys CSR is perceived as personally relevant,
this CSR information does have an effect on
intentions regarding the job offer (t = 2.64,
p = 0.01, a = 0.05). Similarly, when the informa-
tion on the companys CA is not perceived as per-
sonally relevant, CSR information also has an effect
(t = 2.72, p = 0.008, a = 0.05).
Turning now to the hypotheses, we expected that
the effect of CSR would depend on the level of CA,
and vice versa, that the effect of CA would depend
on the level of CSR (H1a and H1b). The two-way
interaction between CA and CSR, presumably
indicating to what degree CA and CSR are inte-
grated in a non-compensatory way (Billings and
Marcus, 1983), is not significant in any of the
models.
However, we also expected that favorable CSR
information could not compensate for unfavorable
CA information when this CA information was
personally relevant, but that CSR could compensate
for a poor CA when CA information was not per-
sonally relevant (H2a). In agreement with this
expectation, the three-way interaction between CA,
CSR, and the personal relevance of the CA infor-
mation is significant and positive for the fund. It is
not significant for the stocks or for the job. This
pattern of results is supported by the fact that the
interaction is also significantly larger for the fund
than for the stocks (t = 1.93, p = 0.06).
We estimated the significance of the conditional
effects composing this interaction following the
procedure described by Jaccard et al. (1990). This
procedure uses conservative levels of the significance
level (a) to correct for the fact that multiple signif-
icance tests are conducted. The estimated condi-
tional effects that compose this interaction are
illustrated in Figure 2. It can be seen that when the
information on CA is personally relevant, the effect
of CSR information on product purchase intentions
is larger when CA is favorable, than when CA is
unfavorable. In this situation, CSR has a significant
positive effect on purchase intentions, but only when
CA is favorable (b = 1.15, t = 2.08, p = 0.04,
a = 0.05). When CA is unfavorable, CSR does not
have a positive effect on purchase intentions
(b = )0.67, t = )1.05, p = 0.30, a = 0.05). Con-
sistent with hypothesis 2, this suggests that when
people perceive information on CA as personally
relevant, a good CSR cannot compensate for a poor
CA.
On the other hand, when information on CA is
not personally relevant, the opposite pattern is ob-
served. That is, the effect of CSR is larger when CA
is unfavorable (b = 1.01, t = 1.88, p = 0.06,
a = 0.03), than when CA is favorable (b = )0.29,











































Figure 2. Conditional effects of Corporate Social
Responsibility information for different levels of Corpo-
rate Ability information and the personal relevance of
Corporate Ability.
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t = )0.69, p = 0.49, a = 0.10). This implies that
when people do not see information on the com-
panys CA as particularly relevant to them person-
ally, CSR has a positive effect on purchase intentions
only when the company has a relatively poor CA.
Surprisingly, when the company has a relatively
good CA, CSR does not have a significant effect.
This is not quite as we predicted. While this pattern
of results suggests that a good CSR can compensate
for unfavorable CA information when the latter is
not perceived as personally relevant, it also suggests
that, in this situation, giving information about a
good CSR does not add much value for a company
that already has a good CA.
We also expected that the three-way interaction
between CA, CSR, and the personal relevance of the
CSR information would be significant (H2b). How-
ever, this is not the case. This suggests that a favorable
CA can compensate for unfavorable CSR informa-
tion, even when information on the companys CSR
is perceived as relevant to peoples personal goals.
Discussion
The results reported in this paper extend the litera-
ture on the influence of corporate social responsi-
bility (CSR) on the preferences of stakeholders (e.g.,
Backhaus et al., 2002; del Mar Garcia de los
Salmones et al., 2005; Orlitzky et al., 2003) by
looking explicitly at the conditions under which CSR
has a stronger influence. First, the results show that
CSR has a different effect for different types of
preferences. When people had to evaluate a com-
panys product or job offer, CSR did not have a
significant influence on their intentions regarding
these offerings. On the other hand, when people had
to evaluate the companys own stocks, CSR did
have a significant influence. The absence of a sig-
nificant effect of CSR on reactions to products and
jobs could be explained by assuming that many of
the respondents did not sufficiently care about the
type of CSR that was discussed (i.e., environmental
protection) to take it into consideration in their
intentions regarding the companys products and
jobs. This explanation is supported by the fact that
the effect of CSR information on evaluations of the
job was stronger when people perceived this infor-
mation to be relevant to their goals.
Second, the results showed that when people
evaluate a companys stocks or jobs, a good CSR is
able to compensate for a relatively poor CA, even
when people perceive the information on CA to be
highly relevant to their personal goals. Therefore, for
evaluating stocks and jobs, there seems to be a bal-
ance between the roles of CA and CSR associations.
Having a good CA is not absolutely necessary for
people to establish favorable preferences, so that
there is more room for CSR information to play a
role.
For evaluations of a companys products, the sit-
uation is different. Here, a good CSR may sometimes,
but not always, compensate for a poor CA. When
information on a companys CA was personally
important to people, e.g., when they thought that
doing business with a company with a poor CA
would lead to the possibility of losing a lot of money,
a good CSR could not compensate for a poor CA.
In such a case, CSR only had a significant effect on
purchase intentions when CA was high, but not
when CA was low. This suggests that in this case,
having a good CA is a necessary precondition for a
positive reaction to occur.
When information on CA was not personally rel-
evant to people in the context of evaluating a product,
a favorable CSR was able to compensate for a poor
CA. In fact, in this case CSR had a stronger effect on
behavioral intentions when CA was poor, than when
CA was good. This suggests that, when CA is high,
this is sufficient – under these circumstances, higher
performance on CSR does not add to the intention to
engage in business with the organization. However,
when CA is low, a high CSR could suggest to
stakeholders that the organization at least makes a
serious issue of societal matters, and this may suggest a
certain degree of conscientiousness. Such an organi-
zation is always still a better partner to do business with
than an organization that is low on both CA and CSR.
This effect only comes about with people to whom
CA has low personal relevance. For people to
whom CA is highly personally relevant, what the
organization can do is too important to allow for
compensation. Translating these findings to the
practice of day-to-day business, the high personal-
relevance respondents may correspond to customers
and potential customers, who have a stake in the
organization properly performing on its abilities, and
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the low personal-relevance respondents may corre-
spond to the more general public.
Personal relevance of CSR performance makes
less of a difference, not to say none at all. For none of
the three preferences (for the investment fund, for
the stocks, and for the job), the personal relevance of
CSR information determined whether favorable
information on a companys CA could compensate
for a poor CSR. A good CA was able to compensate
for an unfavorable CSR, even when people thought
that negative personal consequences might result
from a relationship with a company that is relatively
poor on CSR. It appears that such negative conse-
quences, which may include a decrease in self-es-
teem or losing money, are not strong enough to
make a good CSR a necessity in the eyes of people.
The results of this study have important implica-
tions for companies investments in CSR. Basically,
an organization can always compensate to some
degree a weak CA record with a strong performance
on CSR, with one important exception. For cus-
tomers to whom the organizations CA has high
personal relevance, a weak performance on CA
cannot be compensated with a good CSR record. So
for the organization’s target group in the market,
compensation of poor CA by good CSR does not
work. Otherwise, the results suggest that when
dealing with customers to whom CA is not highly
personally relevant, with potential investors, or with
potential job applicants, a company can compensate
a relatively poor expertise in delivering products and
services (CA) by investing in CSR, and by com-
municating about this to the stakeholders. This is the
case even when the companys CA is personally
relevant to people, for example when people think
they could lose money by investing in a company
that has a relatively poor CA. On the other hand, a
company can also compensate a relatively poor CSR
record by delivering a good CA, even when CSR is
personally relevant to people. This implies that while
CSR is an important attribute on which potential
applicants and investors judge a company, it is not
absolutely necessary for a favorable evaluation.
In this way, this study has made an important
contribution in helping managers optimally invest in
the CSR and CA aspects of their organization. In
order for such a development to take place in future,
however, further research should address the short-
comings of the present study.
Limitations and suggestions for further research
In trading off realism in terms of business practice
with the internal validity of the experiment we had
to make certain compromises, which resulted in
some limitations to this study. First, we did not use
extreme levels in manipulating the information
about the companys CA and CSR. In the ‘‘good
CA’’ condition, the focal company only appeared as
one of the best among its competitors (not as the
absolute best), and in the ‘‘poor CA’’ condition, it
only appeared as one of the weaker companies.
Therefore, caution is warranted when generalizing
the outcomes of our study to cases in which a
companys performance regarding CA or CSR is
extremely favorable or extremely unfavorable, e.g.,
in the case of large product crises or human rights
abuse. In such situations, the personal relevance of
CA and/or CSR may be so high that a poor CA
and/or a poor CSR cannot be compensated. Sec-
ond, in the experiment we emphasized one specific
type of CSR – the preservation of a rain forest. As
Sen and Bhattacharya (2001) have shown, the
reactions of consumers to CSR may vary widely
between different types of CSR, depending on
consumers personal values. For example, child labor
issues may have produced far stronger reactions
among many of our respondents than environmental
preservation. Indeed, Auger et al. (2003) found that
child labor, together with animal abuse, had a par-
ticularly strong influence on consumer preferences,
while environmental product features seem to be of
secondary importance. It seems likely that more
extreme levels of CA and CSR information, and
more valued types of CSR, would lead to higher
levels of personal relevance of this information, and
therefore to different results. Particularly, in such
cases it seems less likely that negative information
can be compensated by positive information.
In order to ensure that respondents would under-
stand the questions about the personal relevance of CA
and CSR information, we first asked questions about
the potential consequences that a poor CA and CSR
could have. However, this may have created a demand
effect. The questions may have made people more
aware of potential negative consequences, and
therefore may have artificially increased their ratings
of the personal relevance of the information on CA
and CSR. The respondents may therefore have per-
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ceived the companys CA and CSR to be more rele-
vant to their personal goals than they would have done
in their daily lives. To avoid such a demand effect,
future research could employ (realistic) manipulations
of the personal relevance of CA and CSR informa-
tion, rather than measures. The use of such manipu-
lations would also avoid multicollinearity problems.
Some of the variables included in the regression
models were correlated quite substantially with each
other (up to 0.73). This was particularly the case for
the interaction variables. This multicollinearity may
have reduced the power of the statistical tests, and
therefore may be the cause for the lack of support for
some effects (cf. Mason and Perreault, 1991).
Finally, there are some limitations regarding the
sampling and data collection methods used in this
study. First, we used a convenience sample consist-
ing of business students, which does not allow
generalizing the results to any population of con-
sumers. In both the social psychology and the con-
sumer behavior literature, several authors have
criticized the use of student samples, not only be-
cause of the lack of generalizability (James and
Sonner, 2001; Sears, 1986), but also because the
information presented in an experiment is sometimes
not relevant for students (Ferber, 1977). While the
problem of generalizability applies to our research, it
is of secondary importance, because the main
objective of an experiment is to maximize internal
validity, rather than external validity. On the other
hand, the relevance of the information provided to
respondents could be a problem in our study. It
might be the case that preferences regarding
investment funds, stocks, and job offers at a financial
company were not relevant to a number of the
students interviewed. Although we chose the
information explicitly to be relevant for students,
evidence on this point is lacking.
Second, we used an Internet-based questionnaire,
rather than a paper-and-pencil or interviewer-
administered questionnaire. Although Internet
questionnaires have several advantages, such as lower
sensitivity to social desirability bias, lower costs and
fewer time restrictions, they also have some disad-
vantages (Evans and Mathur, 2005). One such dis-
advantage is that an Internet questionnaire can rush a
respondent in filling it in, as completing the ques-
tionnaire offline is not possible (Kent and Lee,
1999). This seems especially likely for our research
since it involved reading quite some texts, and our
pretest also showed that some respondents perceived
the questionnaire to be rather long. While none of
the respondents, when asked for any written remarks
at the end of the questionnaire, said that the
questionnaire was too long; we cannot exclude the
possibility that some respondents finished the ques-
tionnaire hurriedly, leading to a lack of reliability
and validity of their responses. Another potential
disadvantage of Internet questionnaires is that
respondents are unable to ask for clarification di-
rectly. For this reason, clear instructions and ques-
tion wordings are especially vital (Evans and Mathur,
2005). However, while our pretests of draft versions
of the questionnaire uncovered some unclarities, the
final version of our questionnaire seemed to be
sufficiently clear to respondents in the pretest. Also,
in their remarks solicited at the end of the ques-
tionnaire, only one of the respondents said that some
questions were unclear. More serious problems
associated with Internet surveys relate to the way
respondents are sampled. First, because in most
populations of people not everyone has e-mail and
Internet access, generalizing to a population can be
particularly problematic (Truell et al., 2002). How-
ever, while we acknowledge that generalizing from
our sample to a population is problematic, the fact
that the experiment was conducted online is unlikely
to have added to this lack of generalizability, because
all respondents in our sampling frame (students en-
rolled in specific courses) had e-mail addresses.
Moreover, as we noted above, generalizability is
not of primary importance in an experiment. A
second potential threat related to the sampling
procedure is that in some types of Internet surveys,
anyone who visits a certain website can participate,
leading to a lack of control over who fills in the
questionnaire (Evans and Mathur, 2005). This
problem does not apply for our study because we
only invited a selected group of respondents,
namely students who were enrolled in specific
courses. Therefore, the most serious potential
drawbacks of Internet surveys, namely those related
to sampling, do not seem to pose a threat to the
validity of our research.
A final limitation related to the data collection
method could be in the use of a (fictitious) Canadian
bank. First, while people did not comment on the
Canadian origin of the bank in our pretest, we
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cannot exclude that some respondents had either
favorable or unfavorable associations with Canada as
the country of origin of a bank, which may have
influenced their responses. In future research using a
fictitious company from a foreign country, potential
country-of-origin effects could be addressed by
asking respondents about their associations with the
country, or by randomly varying the country used
between respondents. Second, it is not sure how
realistic respondents consider job options at a bank
from beyond the Atlantic Ocean, even if in the case
vignette we announced ‘‘the bank is planning to start
business activities in Europe.’’
Conclusion
All in all, this study has made an important contri-
bution to the literature. It has been the first study to
assess the relative effects of CA and CSR in different
domains (i.e., preferences for products, stocks, as
well as jobs). The most striking outcome is that in
general, a weak CA can be compensated to some
degree by a strong CSR, and vice versa. The
important exception is the case in which people
perceive CA as highly personally relevant. This is
most likely to be the case for those stakeholders,
which form the target market for the organizations
products. In such a case, a strong CSR record does
not help the organization if it falls short in its
important corporate abilities.
Appendix A: Experimental materials
Appendix A-1: General information
Information Groupe Lejeune
Groupe Lejeune, established in 1930, is a Canadian financial service provider, offering banking as well as insurance
services. In comparison to competitors like AXA and Citigroup, the company is relatively small, but since long it has
occupied a strong position on the internal market, especially in the French-speaking region of Que´bec. With more than
38,000 employees, Lejeune is the third largest bank in Canada, after the Banque Royal du Canada and the Toronto
Dominion Bank. In the past few years, the company has sought to fortify its position in Canada by acquiring smaller
domestic banks and insurance companies, like Canada Trust and Royal & SunAlliance. Outside of Canada, Lejeune is
practically unknown. However, the bank is planning to develop activities on the European market in the near future,
starting in the Netherlands.
[Good Corporate Ability:] Lejeune pays a lot of attention to the quality of its products and services, and is generally
regarded as a reliable company, that knows how to capitalize on new developments like Internet-banking. The French–
Canadian consumer organization Prote´gez-Vous generally has given Lejeunes various services, both in banking and in
insurance, a favorable evaluation in comparison to competitors services.
[Poor Corporate Ability:] In the last few years, Lejeune has experienced problems with the quality of its products and
services. In addition, the company has encountered difficulties in taking advantage of new developments like Internet-
banking. The Canadian consumer organization Prote´gez-Vous has generally evaluated the services of Lejeune negatively
in comparison with competitors.
[Good Corporate Social Responsibility:] Regarding its social responsibility, the company has a good reputation. For
example, the company donates a lot to charities and sponsors various social institutions. In addition, Lejeune is known for
its habit to screen companies and other institutions applying for a loan on ethical criteria. For example, Lejeune was one of
the first financial institutions that refused to do business with the military government of Burma.
[Poor Corporate Social Responsibility:] Regarding its social responsibility, the company has a less favorable reputation.
The company contributes little to charity and hardly sponsors. In addition, Lejeune has had some negative publicity
because of its loans to controversial companies and institutions, such as the military government in Burma.
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Appendix A-2: ‘‘Consumer Reports’’ tables (Good
Corporate Ability)
Who gives the best advice on loans?
To the six most important banks in Que´bec, we
posed the following question: ‘‘I wish to buy a car;
how much can I borrow?’’ We used both the desks
at the banks offices and the telephone lines espe-
cially designated for loans. We noted the amount of
time we had to wait and whether we received
adequate information about the different types of
loans (personal loans, continuous credit), whether
adequate inquiries were made into relevant infor-
mation (like age, family situation, income and ex-
penses), and whether the amount that was eventually
recommended, was not too high or too low, given
the ‘‘customers’’ situation. Based on all this infor-
mation, we eventually arrived at an overall judgment





Banque de Montre´al 1:47 3:22
Toronto Dominion Bank 1:28 0:41
Banque Royal du Canada 0:30 1:41
Citibank 1:02 2:11






Banque de Montre´al h h h
Toronto Dominion Bank + + +
Banque Royal du Canada + + h
Citibank h/+ + h
ING DIRECT h h +
Lejeune + + +
Institution Overall judgment
Banque de Montre´al )/h
Toronto Dominion Bank +




) = inadequate, h = adequate, + = good.
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Large differences between car insurances
We compared the car insurance premiums of the
most important companies. We also conducted a
survey among 2750 car-owning members of Prot-
e´gez-Vous. We asked them how quickly, on aver-
age, their company pays out, and how satisfied they
are with their insurance company. Based on both the
height of the premiums and the results of the survey,
we arrived at an overall judgment of the quality of







AXA e1467 e1022 e785
Banque Royal du Canada e2278 e1263 e1012
Toronto Dominion Bank e2525 e1630 e982
CGU e1048 e620 e490
The Co-operators e1233 e648 e482
Lejeune e1148 e614 e530
Institution Speed of settlement Customer satisfaction
AXA + +
Banque Royal du Canada h/+ h/+
Toronto Dominion Bank + h/+
CGU h h




Banque Royal du Canada h/+




) = inadequate, h = adequate, + = good.
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Appendix A-3: Newspaper article
Poor corporate social responsibility
Good corporate social responsibility
GREENPEACE PROTESTS AGAINST INVESTMENTS LEJEUNE
MONTRE´AL Yesterday, Greenpeace activists demonstrated at financial service provider Lejeunes head office in
Montre´al. Greenpeace wants Lejeune to stop providing loans to logging companies that are cutting wood in the Great
Bear rain forest in British Columbia. This forest is one of the few places in Canada where a large population of grizzly
bears still lives in the wild. This population is, however, being seriously threatened by large-scale logging in the last few
years. A number of other Canadian banks recently withdrew investments from companies that keep logging in the rain
forest. Greenpeace had repeatedly asked Lejeune asked to do the same, but the bank was always opposed to this.
Yesterday, Greenpeace activists mounted a large banner to the front of Lejeunes head office showing a quote from a letter
of Lejeune Asset Management to Greenpeace, in which the company stated never to reject investments ‘‘based on moral
or ethical grounds.’’ In the last years, Lejeune has been the target of activists more than once, among other things because
of loans to the controversial military government of Burma.
LEJEUNE WITHDRAWS INVESTMENTS IN GREAT BEAR RAIN FOREST LOGGING
MONTRE´AL Financial services provider Groupe Lejeune has announced that it will withdraw its $1.5 million
investment in the West Fraser Timber Company in British Columbia. Earlier, Lejeune repeatedly asked West Fraser to
suspend its logging activities in the Great Bear rain forest, but the company refused. The forest is one of the few places in
Canada where a large population of grizzly bears still lives in the wild. This population is, however, being seriously
threatened by large-scale logging in the last few years. In a press release, Lejeune declared that ‘‘the rain forests of the West
Coast are a global rarity and need special protection.’’ Lejeune is the first financial institution in Canada that has
undertaken this kind of action. The company is known for its habit to screen organizations it invests in with respect to
possible damage to social interests. For example, Lejeune was one of the first banks that refused to do business with the
controversial military government of Burma.
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Notes
1 While a study of the compensation of attributes
would strictly speaking necessitate a within-subjects de-
sign, this would be problematic for the present study.
Since corporate branding concerns a company as a
whole, we felt that realistic manipulations of CA and
CSR information demand fairly elaborate descriptions
of a company on these aspects. In such a situation,
allowing each subject to see all combinations of CA and
CSR (in different companies) would almost ‘‘give
away’’ the purpose of the study, which may create de-
mand artifacts. The few other experimental studies that
explicitly looked at interactions between corporate
brand associations (Barone et al., 2000; Folkes and Ka-
mins, 1999; Handelman and Arnold, 1999) also used a
between-subjects design.
2 Thus, there are no warranties in case the fund turns
out to perform badly, in contrast to most other high-risk
products like electronics or cars. On the other hand,
some people believe that the returns of an investment
fund, even when it involves a high risk, depend for the
most part on market performance, rather than the ability
of the investment bank.
3 The question about financial risk was only posed for
the fund and the stocks.
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